Michigan Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 3

1959

Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Municipalities
Wilbert L. Ziegler
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Land Use Law Commons, Legislation Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, State
and Local Government Law Commons, and the Water Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Wilbert L. Ziegler, Acquisition and Protection of Water Supplies by Municipalities, 57 MICH. L. REV. 349
(1959).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ACQUISITION AND PROTECTION OF WATER
SUPPLIES BY MUNICIPALITIESt

Wilbert L. Ziegler*
the prime functions of a municipal government is
the furnishing of a potable supply of water for its inhabitants. In view of the increasing demand for water and the
shortage of available supply, a number of problems have been
or will be encountered by municipalities in fulfilling that function, apart from the problem of financing.
Generally speaking two major legal methods have been employed by municipalities to secure a supply of water for their
corporate territory, and each method raises peculiar legal problems. The first method, by far the most popular, is the establishment of a municipal waterworks either within or without the
corporate limits. In establishing its own facilities the municipality is confronted with the problem of adequate powers. It must
have power to overcome limitations imposed by the common
law and antagonisms presented by the private landowner. Besides power to establish, the municipality needs adequate power
to protect its water supply against destruction and pollution
as well as power to protect new sites for future use. When protection by means of police power regulation is attempted, problems immediately arise concerning the propriety of individual
regulations under the state and federal constitutions. These
problems, although present when the municipality acts within its
boundaries, always increase when it tries to establish or protect
its supply outside municipal limits.
The second major method available to the muncipality for
securing adequate water supplies is through cooperation with
others in the formation of a water district. A municipality desiring to cooperate in a water district is faced with the problem
of securing adequate representation both in the formation and
in the management of the district. This problem, as well as those
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facing the district, through which the municipality will be operating, must be considered by a municipal unit before embarking on
any joint endeavor.

I.

MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY WITHIN THE CORPORATE LIMITS

Whether a municipality, in the absence of express power from
the legislature, may provide a water supply for its inhabitants
is a question for which the courts have not agreed on an answer.1
Most state legislatures, however, realizing the importance of a
potable water supply have enacted enabling legislation permitting a municipality to act within its corporate limits to provide for a supply of water.2 The great number of municipal
waterworks throughout the country attest to the adequacy of
these legislative grants of power.
In many small towns and villages, however, the construction
or purchase of a waterworks, being a costly endeavor, has been
unsatisfactory as a method of acquiring a water supply. To solve
this problem, some jurisdictions have delegated to their municipalities power to contract for a water supply.3 This shifts to the
contracting supplier the burden of providing a source of water,
establishing and maintaining a waterworks system, and distributing the water throughout the territory. 4 An established sup-

1 61 L.R.A. 33, 34 (1903) sets forth cases which may be cited to support either side
of the issue. See also 56 AM. JUR., Watenvorks §§24, 54 (1947): City of Gadsden v.
Mitchell, 145 Ala. 137, 40 S. 557 (1906); Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1922).
2 E.g.: Power to acquire existing waterworks: Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §418;
Ark. Stat. Ann. (1956 repl.) §§19-2317, 19-4201; Idaho Code Ann. (1957) §50-2815; Power
to construct waterworks: 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §20(2); Miss. Code
Ann. (1942) §3374-112; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §38:3; Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §13932-1(35); Power of eminent domain to obtain a water supply: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947)
· §§35-401, 35-902; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §418; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3374-128;
Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 40, §14; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1949) tit. 32, §639; Ky. Rev.
Stat. (1956) §94.680. Legislative authority to delegate these powers to the municipality
"is no longer questioned." East Grand Forks v. Luclc, 97 Minn. 373 at 374, 107 N.W. 393
(1906); Normal School v. Charleston, 271 Ill. 602, Ill N.E. 573 (1916); Bank of Commerce
v. Huddleston, 172 Ark. 999, 291 S.W. 422 (1927).
S Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §423; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§96.120 to 96.150; Ark.
Stat. Ann. (1956 repl.) §19.2319; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §23-36.1; Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1936) §5.1419.
4 The court in White v. Meadville, I 77 Pa. 643 at 653, 35 A. 695 (1896), states: "A
municipality, in its beginnings, is perhaps not financially strong, or its debt may approach
the constitutional limit so closely that it cannot borrow; nevertheless, the low state of
its financial condition does not render less urgent the necessity of a water supply; it can
obtain it in but one way, by contract with those who have the money and are willing to
invest their private capital in the construction of waterworks. • • ."
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plier usually can furnish water at a rate cheaper than can the
municipality which initially has no facilities. In addition to the
monetary benefits presented, contracting on behalf of its inhabitants allows the municipality to present a package deal to
an interested supplier who might be disinterested if required
to contract individually with each member of the community.
Legislative enactments empowering a municipality to construct and operate a waterworks or to contract for a water supply
have existed in most states for many years unchanged and unchallenged. These powers coupled with the police power of
the municipality are adequate to enable the municipal unit to
provide and protect a supply of water within the municipal
boundaries for itself and its inhabitants. 5 The failure of any
particular jurisdiction to possess legislation granting these powers to the municipalities is not due to the unwillingness of the
legislature or to interference by the courts, but rather to the
absence of need for the legislation and the corresponding lack
of concern and interest on the part of municipal bodies within
the state.

II.

MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY OUTSIDE THE CORPORATE LIMITS

A. General Observations. The universal rule relating to the
exercise of powers or activities by a municipality outside its
territorial limits has become firmly entrenched in the common
law and receives worshipful lip service from all American courts.
This rule provides that a municipality may not exercise powers
beyond its territorial limits in the absence of an expressed or
implied delegation of authority by the state constitution or state
legislature. 6 Without a constitutional or statutory provision, this
rule, if applied relentlessly by the courts, would preclude a
municipality from acquiring extraterritorial land or water rights,
exercising eminent domain therefor, or exercising extraterritorial
police power.
B. Purchase and Holding of Land. A municipality going beyond its borders for a source of water must possess and hold
property outside its boundaries. Only after this power is established can the questions concerning extraterritorial eminent

5 7 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §24.265 (1949).
6 37 AM. JUR., Mun. Corp. §122 (1941), and cases cited therein.
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domain or police power arise. Forty states provide municipalities
with power to purchase and hold property beyond their boundaries for the purpose of obtaining potable water. 7 No distinction
is made in the statutes between incorporated or unincorporated
extraterritorial lands. A majority of the states designate no limitations as to the location of the water facilities, but a few jurisdictions limit the exercise of the power to an area within a
specified number of miles from the corporate boundaries. 8 These
distance limitations were added, no doubt, to eliminate conflicts between the municip~l units as well as to maintain a certain
amount of equity in the distribution of the water resources
among various areas of the state.
In the absence of an expressed grant of power through the
constitution, statute, or municipal charter0 to acquire extraterritorial property, the question of extraterritorial power must
be resolved by the courts. In spite of the general rule against the
exercise of extraterritorial powers by a municipality, the majority
of courts, relying on various modes of legal reasoning,10 have

7 An extensive note in 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 100 at 101, lists these states as
Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and 'Wyoming. For specific statutory language, see, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. (1953) §139-32-1(35); Iowa Code Ann.
(1946) §397.1; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §96.350; Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §3374-112; 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §20(2). An Indiana act [Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns,
1950 rep!.; Supp. 1957) §§48-5301 to 48-5374] effectively grants extraterritorial powers by
permitting the city to organize for itself a waterworks district, the boundaries and powers
of which extend to a radius of five miles beyond the city limits.
s Limitations placed on the geographical area in which a municipality may lawfully
acquire a water supply outside its boundaries vary from two to seventy-five miles from
the corporate limits. Cf. note, 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FORUM 100 at 101.
9 Typical of charter provisions are those found in Connecticut charters. In that state
no constitutional or general legislation exists granting to municipalities the power to go
beyond their borders for a water supply; consequently, issues involving the exercise of
such powers have arisen in the instance of charter provisions only. The courts have recognized as valid grants of this power by charter or by special legislation. West Hartford
v. Board of Water Commissioners, 44 Conn. 360 (1877); Dunham v. New Britain, 55 Conn.
378, 11 A. 354 (1877).
10 In some instances, the courts have implied the power from the necessity of the
occasion. Coldwater v. Tucker, 36 Mich. 474 (1877); Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160,
48 N.E. 1092 (1898); Langley v. Augusta, 118 Ga. 590, 45 S.E. 486 (1903). See also Harden
v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. (2d) 630, 284 P. (2d) 9 (1955). In other cases, the courts have
distinguished between an exercise of governmental authority, which is forbidden beyond
the corporate bounds, and the mere purchase of land outside the municipality. Becker
v. La Crosse, 99 Wis. 414, 75 N.W. 84 (1898); Schneider v. Menasha, 118 Wis. 298, 95 N.W.
94 (1903); Smith v. Kuttawa, 222 Ky. 569, 1 S.W. (2d) 979 (1928).
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allowed the municipalities to acquire lands and property rights
beyond their boundaries for legitimate municipal purposes.11
Of the states which possess no express statutory or constitutional
grant of power to acquire extraterritorial property for a water
supply,12 Georgia, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have court
determinations relevant to the discussion. In Georgia, the court,
in Hall v. Calhoun_, decided that where a city had the power
to establish and construct a waterworks, without limitation as to
location, it could go beyond its borders to obtain a supply of
water. 13 The courts of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, although not faced with a water supply issue, have held that for
legitimate municipal purposes, a city may acquire land beyond
its borders.14 There is every reason to believe that a court impressed with the realization that "a city is not a self-sufficing
unit" 15 will permit the municipality to acquire and hold property
beyond its corporate limits for municipal purposes, including
property for a water supply, even though the municipality has no
constitutional or statutory grant of power.16
C. Extraterritorial Condemnation. Although a municipality
may be permitted by the courts or empowered by the legislature
to purchase and hold extraterritorial lands for a water supply, it
may lack the power of extraterritorial eminent domain. The
power of eminent domain is not included necessarily in the power

11 " ••• [I]t is believed that the rule, supported by the weight of authority as well as
by the better reasoning, is that a municipal corporation, where not expressly prohibited,
may purchase real estate outside of its corporate limits, for legitimate municipal purposes. • . ." JO McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §28.05 (1950); Smith v.
Kuttawa, 222 Ky. 569, 1 S.W. (2d) 979 (1928); Fournier v. Berlin, 92 N.H. 142, 26 A. (2d)
366 (1942); Lester v. Jackson, 69 Miss. 887, 11 S. 114 (1892); Mathers v. Moss, 202 Ark.
554, 151 S.W. (2d) 660 (1941); Ft. Payne Co. v. Ft. Payne, 216 Ala. 679, 114 S. 63 (1927),
but cf. Donable's Admr. v. Harrisburg, 104 Va. 533, 52 S.E. 174 (1905).
12 The states which possess no express statutory or constitutional grant of power
to acquire extraterritorial property for a water supply include Connecticut, Delaware,
Georgia, Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island.
13 140 Ga. 611, 79 S.E. 533 (1913). The court refused to follow an earlier decision,
Loyd v. Columbus, 90 Ga. 20, 15 S.E. 818 (1892), which prohibited a municipality from
providing for extraterritorial disposition of its sewage.
14 Somerville v. Waltham, 170 Mass. 160, 48 N.E. 1092 (1898); Fournier v. Berlin,
92 N.H. 142, 26 A. (2d) 366 (1942). Both cases determined that a municipality could
acquire a gravel pit located outside its territorial limits. The pit involved in the Massachusetts case was situated in another municipality.
15 Anderson, "The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities," 10 MINN. L. REV. 475 (1926).
16 Wehrle v. Board of Water & Power Commissioners of Los Angeles, 211 Cal. 70,
293 P. 67 (1930); E. Hartford Fire Dist. v. Glastonbury Power Co., 92 Conn. 217, 102 A.
592 (1917); Natcher v. Bowling Green, 264 Ky. 584, 95 S.W. (2d) 255 (1936).
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to purchase and hold land. It is distinct and must be expressly
or impliedly delegated to the municipality.17 Many states have
provided expressly that a municipality may exercise eminent
domain beyond its corporate limits in order to acquire a water
supply or the facilities therefor. 18 Like the power to purchase
lands, the power of extraterritorial condemnation is not limited
to incorporated or unincorporated lands, but is restricted by
some states to a designated geographical area immediately outside
the corporate limits.19
In a jurisdiction which has no provision granting to the
municipality power to condemn outside lands for a water supply,
the courts must decide the question of whether, in a particular
instance, a municipality may exercise this power. This question
has been presented to the courts in two factual settings. The
first involves a municipality which has express power to hold
property beyond its limits but no express power to condemn
therefor; the second arises when express power to hold and condemn land within the city limits for a water supply is granted
but there is no express power to condemn beyond the corporate
boundaries.20 In the first situation, the Michigan Supreme Court
in the case of Allegan v. Iosco Land Co.21 held that a constitutional provision permitting any city or village to "acquire, ovm

17 I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §3.221(3) (1950), citing the federal and thirty-one
state jurisdictions, states: "The establishment of a municipal corporation by the legislature, and the grant of a charter to the corporation so established containing provisions
for the exercise of the usual governmental powers by such a body within its territorial
limits, does not in itself convey the power to take land by eminent domain in order to
carry such powers into effect, and in the absence of express or necessarily implied authority
from the legislature neither a municipal corporation nor its officers and boards can exercise the power of eminent domain."
18 ·E.g., Idaho Code Ann. (1957) §50-2815; Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §74-2; Iowa
Code Ann. (1946) §397.8(1); Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947) §457.02; 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §20(2).
19 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §94.680, which limits condemnation power to territory
within the county where the city is located. The legislature may lawfully delegate extraterritorial eminent domain power to municipalities. Allegan v. Iosco Land Co., 254
Mich. 560, 236 N.W. 863 (1931); I NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §3.221(3) (1950), and cases
cited therein; 18 AM. JUR., Eminent Domain §26 (1938).
20 Where a municipality is not permitted to own or operate a city water supply even
within its limits, the question of eminent domain is moot.
21254 Mich. 560, 236 N.W. 863 (1931). The court, however, permitted the city to
condemn beyond its boundaries for a water supply under its home rule charter which
authorized extraterritorial acquisition of a public utility by condemnation. For statutes
expressly delegating to Michigan municipalities the power of eminent domain to be exercised for a water supply beyond their corporate limits, see .Mich. Stat. Ann (1936) §8.71,
(1949) §5.1893, (Supp. 1957) §5.2079(3).
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and operate, either within or without its corporate limits, public
utilities for supplying water . . ." 22 did not confer power to
condemn public utilities.23 On the other hand, in the case of
Helm v. Grayville,24 the Illinois Supreme Court held that where
a city by statute had the power to purchase, lease, or acquire by
gift land for a ferry outside its corporate limits, the city likewise
could exercise the power of eminent domain for this purpose.
Although this case did not involve the acquisition of a water
supply, it manifests a judicial attitude, which, in opposition
to the Michigan court,25 would permit a city having the power
to purchase land for a public water utility also to exercise eminent
domain. The principle of the Illinois decision appears, by weight
of numbers, to be the majority rule; 26 however, in view of the
scarcity of judicial opinions on the issue, it cannot be alleged
with certainty that if a city is granted power to purchase land
beyond its limits for a water supply, it will be permitted by the
courts to exercise eminent domain for this purpose.
Several cases have treated the issue of whether power of
extraterritorial condemnation by a city can be implied from an
express grant of this power within the city. Once again the
Michigan Supreme Court has given a strict interpretation to a
provision granting power to villages. The Michigan court held
that where a village had condemnation power within its limits
to obtain a water supply, but no power expressly granted to
acquire water outside the village, the village could not condemn
land without its boundaries for this purpose.27 This rule, however, has not received approval in other jurisdictions. Decisions

MICH. CoNsr., Art. VIII, §23.
Cf. Detroit v. Circuit Judge, 237 Mich. 446, 212 N.W. 207 (1927), relating to acquisition of a park beyond the corporate limits of the city of Detroit by means of condemnation.
24 224 Ill. 274, 79 N.E. 689 (1906).
25 In the area of municipal powers the Michigan Supreme Court has been most conservative. See Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N.W. 820 (1885);
People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 2ll (1902).
26 Warner v. Gunnison, 2 Colo. App. 430 (1892); Colorado Springs v. Public Utilities
Comm., 126 Colo. 265, 248 P. (2d) 3ll (1952); Sewer Improvement Dist. #l of Sheridan
v. Jones, Admx., 199 Ark. 534, 134 S.W. (2d) 551 (1939); Central Power Co. v. Nebraska
City, (8th Cir. 1940) ll2 F. (2d) 471. Cf. Spokane v. Williams, 157 Wash. 120, 288 P. 258
(1930).
27 Houghton v. Huron Copper Mining Co., 57 Mich. 547, 24 N.W. 820 (1885). The
rule has been formulated thus: "When the power to exercise eminent domain for certain
purposes is expressly granted to a municipal corporation, land outside its territorial
limits cannot be condemned without special authority.•.." l NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
§3.221(3) (1950). Cf. 18 A11r. JUR., Eminent Domain §27 (1938).
22

23
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in Colorado,28 Illinois,29 and Washington,30 although not involving water supplies, clearly indicate that the Michigan rule of
strict interpretation is in the minority. In West Virginia31 and
Wyoming,32 the courts have held that where a city has condemnation power to obtain a water supply, and there are no express
limitations on the territory in which the water may be obtained,
the city may condemn land beyond its corporate limits.
Without the power of eminent domain, a municipality, because of local animosity or inability to reach a monetary agreement, may effectively be deprived of a water supply outside
its jurisdiction even though it has the power to purchase and hold
outside property. A court determination denying the municipality extraterritorial eminent domain power can be avoided by a
legislative enactment granting to municipal units the power of
condemnation for a water supply beyond their boundaries.
D. Water Rights Without Condemnation. The power to
acquire property is essential for the municipality going beyond
its limits for a supply of water, but acquisition by purchase or
condemnation is expensive. A municipality must look not only to
its power to acquire property but also to the cost of the development. In this regard, it is necessary to examine what water rights
beyond its boundaries a municipality may acquire without cost
as incident to its acquisition of outside lands.33 When a municipality ventures beyond its limits to establish a reservoir to capture
diffused surface waters, or to dam a stream or lake causing
inundation of lands, the municipality will be forced to acquire,
by purchase, condemnation or otherwise, the lands which are
to be covered by water. However, the problem remains whether
the municipality must compensate anyone for the water it takes
from beyond its corporate limits.
The two legal doctrines which have prevailed in the field of
28 Colorado Central Power Co. v. Englewood, (10th Cir. 1937) 89 F. (2d) 233; Public
Serv. Co. v. Loveland, 79 Colo. 216, 245 P. 493 (1926), concerning the taking of a power
plant.
29 Maywood Co. v. Maywood, 140 III. 216, 29 N.E. 704 (1892), concerning extrater•
ritorial sewage disposal.
30 Puyallup v. Lacey, 43 Wash. 110, 86 P. 215 (1906), concerning the straightening of
a stream, one bank of which was beyond the corporate limits.
31 White v. Romney, 69 W. Va. 606, 73 S.E. 323 (1911).
32 Edwards v. Cheyenne, 19 Wyo. 110, 114 P. 677 (1911).
33 For a detailed presentation of the common law doctrines of water use law, including a consideration of the water rights of municipalities, see Ziegler, "Water Use Under
Common Law Doctrine," WATER REsOURCES AND THE I.Aw (1958).
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water use are the doctrines of absolute use and reasonable use. By
the theory of absolute use, a landowner is entitled to possession
and complete control of all waters coming to his land. Under
the reasonable use concept, a landowner is permitted to make
a use of the waters to which he has access which is reasonable in
relation to other uses being made of the same supply of water.
The doctrine of absolute use would assure to the municipality
control of a water supply by mere ownership of land; the doctrine
of reasonable use may render the same. assurance in application,
or it may not, depending upon whether the use by the municipality is considered reasonable.
The doctrine of reasonableness has always been applied to
the use of water from natural streams or lakes on which more
than one person's land abuts, although the courts have designated certain uses as unreasonable per se.34 Under the reasonable
use concept, the courts have not been sympathetic to the needs
of the municipalities which have come beyond their bounds
to tap a natural stream or lake for water. When a municipality's
activity results in injury to a lawful use made by another
riparian landowner, a city will be prohibited from continuing
its use unless it condemns the water right of the complainant.
Or the city may be ordered by the court to pay damages for the
injury caused. 35 This method employed by the courts eliminates
a condemnation action by the municipality, yet accomplishes the
same end. Basically, there are two principles of water use law
underlying the courts' decisions against the municipalities. First,
use of water from a natural stream or lake on land not abutting
the waters is an unlawful use; 36 secondly, a city with its many
inhabitants was never contemplated at common law to be a "riparian landowner" entitled to make a reasonable use of water
flowing by his land.37
In determining the relative rights of landowners to make use
of the ground waters flowing beneath their land, the courts traditionally have applied the doctrine of absolute use.88 This theory,
84 E.g., Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130 (1854).
35 Ibid.; Elkhart v. Christiana Hydraulics, 223 Ind. 242, 59 N.E. (2d) 353 (1945);
Crawford Co. v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903).
so Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92, 77 S.E. 535 (1913).
37 Pernell v. Henderson, 220 N.C. 79, 16 S.E. (2d) 449 (1941).
38 New River Co. v. Johnson, 2 El. &: EI. 435, 121 Eng. Rep. 164 (1860); Houston &:
T.C.R. Co. v. East, 98 Tex. 146, 81 S.W. 279 (1904); Fire District v. Graniteville Spring
Water Co., 103 Vt. 89, 152 A. 42 (1930).
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if extended to a municipality pumping water from its extraterritorial land, would allow the municipal unit to use all the ground
water it required regardless of any resultant injury to other users.
However, as the practice of diverting waters from one ground water basin to another increased, the courts refused to follow an absolute use principle and applied the doctrine of reasonable use.39
An application of this doctrine generally will result in a municipal corporation being denied the right to divert ground waters
for use in the municipality some distance away, if injury to other
lawful ground water users results. 40
There is little or no indication of what result will be reached
by the courts if a municipality, in constructing a reservoir to
collect diffused surface waters flowing over its lands, interferes
with another landowner's use of these waters. The owner of land
is considered to have absolute control over the diffused waters on
his land; 41 however, it is likely that, as in the case of ground water,
the courts will apply some form of reasonable use doctrine when a
municipality's diverting of diffused water away from the area of
its source results in injury to another user.
In any instance of a municipal corporation diverting water
from outside its limits into the city for use by its inhabitants,
where no injury results to another user, it is highly probable that,
in most states, the courts will not interfere with the city's diverting.42 Where, at the suit of any particular complainant, a municipal unit is held not to be entitled to divert water for a water supply, the municipality is not deprived thereby of its water source.
The decision of the court against the municipality merely requires purchase or condemnation of the water rights of the complainant which the court held were violated by the actions of the
municipality.
39 Katz v. Walkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116, 70 P. 663 (1902): Forbell v. City of New York,
164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Meeker v. East Orange, 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909);
K.och v. Wick, (Fla. 1956) 87 S. (2d) 47.
·
40 Forbell v. City of New York, 164 N.Y. 522, 58 N.E. 644 (1900); Canada v. Shawnee,
179 Okla. 53, 64 P. (2d) 694 (1937).
41 Livingston v. McDonald, 21 Iowa 160 (1866); Gibbs v. Williams, 25 Kan. 149 (1881);
Turner v. Big Lake Oil Co., 128 Tex. 155, 96 S.W. (2d) 221 (1936); Messinger v. Woodcock, 159 Ore. 435, 80 P. (2d) 895 (1938). Contra: Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H.
569 (1862); Swett v. Cutts, 50 N.H. 439 (1870). The New Hampshire cases apply the rule
of reasonable use.
42 Crawford v. Hathaway, 67 Neb. 325, 93 N.W. 781 (1903); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon
Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913): McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling Co.,
38 N.D. 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917); Harris v. Norfolk &: Western Ry. Co., 153 N.C. 542, 69
S.E. 623 (1910).
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In western prior appropriation states,43 a municipality, like
any individual, is entitled to appropriate, in accordance with the
statutory procedure, available water and to acquire thereby a
right to take a determined quantity. 44 This right is subject only
to the rights of users prior in time. No distinction is made as to
the location of the municipal unit in relation to the water source
or as to the quantity of water appropriated. If there is no water
available because of prior appropriations, the municipality must
rely on its power to purchase or condemn the prior rights.
E. Extraterritorial Police Power. As previously discussed,45
the municipal corporation in acquiring an extraterritorial water
supply may be required to purchase or condemn water rights in
addition to lands if the diverting interferes with other persons'
uses of the water. There are, however, other rights belonging to
landowners adjacent to a natural supply of water which, when exercised, probably will not be bothered by the municipality, but
will interfere with the municipal use by damaging the purity of
the water. These uses include swimming, boating, bathing, and
fishing in natural streams and lakes as well as reasonable use of
the land located about the waters. 46 If a municipality has no extraterritorial police power, it is unable to prevent acts which may
tend to pollute the waters unless it condemns the landowner's
rights to the use. Although a municipality may possess police
power within its boundaries sufficient to protect its water, the
necessity for preserving the purity of a potable water supply
does not terminate at the municipal limits.
There are traditional legal methods available to the city to
protect its outside water supply. The city -may exclude persons
from its reservoir47 or sue to enjoin trespass thereon. But, as a

43 Seventeen western states have by constitutional provision or statutory enactment
adopted the doctrine of prior appropriation for their surface streams and lakes. Many
of these states likewise apply this doctrine to their ground water supplies. Diffused surface
water uses are still regulated by the common law in these states insofar as the common
law is applicable to local conditions.
44 For examples of prior appropriation statutes, see Cal. Water Code (Deering, 1954)
§1200 et seq.
45 Part 11-D supra.
46 These rights are incident to the ownership of land located along the banks of
a stream or lake.
47 E.g., Phillips v. City of Golden, 91 Colo. 331, 14 P. (2d) 1013 (1932). In this case
the court, in denying petitioner's claim for damages from the city growing out of injury
to his cattle when driven from city property, affirmed the proposition that the city has
a right to drive the cattle from its watershed.
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practical matter, these remedies against individual trespassers are
ineffectual since it is most difficult for the municipality to show
actual damages, and the sanctions imposed for trespass in the absence of provable damages are de minimis. As a riparian owner,
the city has the right to enjoy the water passing by its land in an
undefiled state; 48 however, other landowners similarly situated
have a right to use the water and their land adjacent in a reasonable manner. 49 Boating, swimming, bathing, and fishing are reasonable uses of the water; 50 cattle raising, plowing, and fertilizing
appear to be reasonable uses of the adjacent land.51 Since these
are reasonable uses, the municipality is in a difficult position trying to prevent them through court injunction. Only by a valid
exercise of the police power can these rights to the use of water
and the land adjacent be regulated or curtailed without an exercise of eminent domain.
The courts have agreed, with only a few exceptions, that a
municipality may not exercise police power beyond its jurisdictional limits unless this power has been delegated specifically by
the legislature or by the state constitution.52 In certain cases, the
courts have permitted a municipality, without express delegated
power, to regulate enterprises located outside the municipality
as a condition to permitting that enterprise to do business within
the corporate limits.53 However, a municipal ordinance designed
to prohibit or limit certain activities beyond the municipal
boundaries to safeguard the purity of a municipal water supply
is a mandatory, unconditional _prohibition and cannot be justified

48 See 56 AM. JUR., Waters §405 (1947), and cases from thirty jurisdictions cited in
support thereof.
49 Id., §406.
50 Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930); Butler v. Atty. Gen., 195 Mass.
79, 80 N.E. 688 (1907); State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189 (1911); 56 AM. JUR., Waters
§275 (1947). But see Harvey Realty Co. v. Wallingford, 111 Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930),
where bathing and swimming by a great number of people is not considered as being
within the riparian right. See dictum in People v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211
(1902); Battle Creek v. Resort Assn., 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914).
51 See George v. Village of Chester, 111 N.Y.S. 722 (1908).
52 6 McQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §24.57 (1949).
53 In re Blois, 179 Cal. 291, 176 P. 449 (1918); State v. Nelson, 66 Minn. 166, 68 N.W.
1066 (1896); Hall Bros. v. Cleveland, (Ohio App. 1953) 115 N.E. (2d) 697; Sterett &: Oberle
Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Ore. 260, 154 P. 410 (1916); Korth v. Portland, 123 Ore. 180,
261 P. 895 (1927); Norfolk v. Flynn, 101 Va. 473 (1903). Contra: Oakland v. Brock, 8 Cal.
(2d) 639, 67 P. (2d) 344 (1937); Rockford v. Hey, 366 Ill. 526, 9 N.E. (2d) 317 (1937);
Higgins v. Galesburg, 401 Ill. 87, 81 N.E. (2d) 520 (1948); Dean Milk Co. v. Aurora, 404
Ill. 331, 88 N.E. (2d) 827 (1949).
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under those cases dealing with licensing or inspection of outside
milk plants or slaughterhouses. 54
There are only two cases in which the courts have indicated
that a municipality may exercise unconditional extraterritorial
police power without an express grant of power from the legislature. In Lexington v. ]ones,55 it appeared that the city of
Lexington provided for the fining of anyone who tapped into
the city sewer line located outside the city without paying the
sewerage fee. The Kentucky Court of Appeals upheld this practice stating that it constituted a valid exercise of the police power
of the city.56 In Missouri, the high court, in the case of Chambers
v. St. Louis,51 decided that the city of St. Louis may hold land outside its corporate limits without special legislative sanction. By
way of dictum, the court, referring to the lands stated that the
city may exercise "such police powers as would be required in
order to make them answer the purposes for which they were designed."58 These two cases, when compared to the great number
of cases to the contrary, are insignificant, and as precedent cannot justify a municipality's exercise of extraterritorial police
power to preserve its water supply in the absence of a delegation
of power by the legislature or the constitution.
Many legislatures have been aware of the problem of municipalities having a supply of water beyond their territorial limits

54 In Sterett & Oberle Packing Co. v. Portland, 79 Ore. 260, 154 P. 410 (1916), the
court pointed out that an ordinance providing for the maintenance of certain health
standards for outside slaughterhouses was valid only as it prohibited the sale of meats
within the city and not as it attempted to enforce regulation of production outside the
city limits. This same distinction is made by the court in State v. Davis, 1 Tenn. C.C.A.
550 (19ll).
55 289 Ky. 719, 160 S.W. (2d) 19 (1942).
56 In a concluding paragraph of the case, the court points out Ky. Rev. Stat. §§3058-5,
3058-23 [now Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§84.170, 84.010]. The first of these sections gives cities
power to regulate by ordinance the use of culverts and sewers; the second allows a city
to impose fines for violations of any city ordinance. Neither section refers expressly to
actions beyond the city limits. It is not apparent from a reading of the decision what
importance the court placed on these two sections as constituting a legislative grant of
power to the city to regulate by its police power the connections with its sewer lines
located beyond its corporate limits.
57 29 Mo. 543 (1860).
58 Id. at 575. In Pueblo v. Flanders, 122 Colo. 571, 225 P. (2d) 832 (1950), a taxpayer
attempted to enjoin the city of Pueblo from furnishing gratuitously fire service to inhabitants outside the city. The court in denying the injunction distinguished between an
exercise of governmental power to regulate persons beyond the limits of the city and
an exercise of the power to assist persons beyond the boundaries of the city. The court
held that the latter was not within the rule prohibiting a city from exercising its governmental powers beyond the corporate limits.
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which must be protected, and in more than one half of the
states the legislatures have granted municipalities sufficient police
power to safeguard the purity of these waters. 59 With the exception of the Washington Supreme Court,60 courts deciding the
issue have sustained legislative delegations of extraterritorial
police power to municipalities.61

III.

VALIDITY

oF

REGULATIONS DESIGNED

To

PROTECT

MUNICIPAL WATER SUPPLY

The foregoing discussion indicates that, except in Washington,62 a grant of police power to a municipality by the legislature
to protect the municipality's water supply will be upheld as to
waters located within or without the corporate limits. A more
controversial attitude surrounds the issue of the validity of
particular ordinances passed pursuant to a legislative grant of
authority, and it is to a consideration of these ordinances that
the discussion now turns.
The legal challenge to the validity of an exercise of the
police power to preserve the purity of a water supply and the
legal principles utilized in a solution of the problem will be
the same whether the power is exercised within or without the
municipality, or whether a municipal ordinance, state law, county
regulation, or district ordinance is involved. In view of this
fact, it seems proper to consider without distinction all decisions
in which the validity of a water purity statute or ordinance has

59 Note, 1957 UNIV. ILL. L. FotmM 99 at 101, lists these states as Alabama, Arkansas,
Colorado, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming. Kentucky recently
enacted a similar provision, Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §96.355.
60 Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927). WASH. CONST., Art.
XI, §11, reads: "Any county, city, town or township, may make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with
general laws." This provision is viewed as a delegation of plenary power to local divisions
of government but limited to the objects designated. Seattle v. Proctor, 183 Wash. 293,
48 P. (2d) 238 (1935). Ohio has a constitutional provision, Omo CoNST., Art. XVIII, §3,
nearly identical in language to the Washington section; however, the Ohio statute [Ohio
Rev. Code (Page, 1953) §743.25] granting police power to the municipalities in Ohio to
preserve their outside water supplies has never been questioned as being unconstitutional.
61 E.g., Van Hook v. Selma, 70 Ala. 361 (1881); Treadgill v. State, (Tex. Crim. App.
1954) 275 S.W. (2d) 658.
62 Brown v. City of Cle Elum, 145 Wash. 588, 261 P. 112 (1927).
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been questioned. This broad view will facilitate an evaluation
of the effectiveness of a city's police power over its source of
potable water.
State statutes prohibiting the discharge of polluting matter
into any body of water from ,vhich a public drinking supply is
taken uniformly have been declared valid exercises of the police
power, 63 even though there was no showing that the particular
discharge of polluting matter adversely affected the quality of
the water at the intake for the public supply. 64 Because of the
great difficulty of showing that any particular dumping of polluting materials into the water affected the quality at the city's
source of supply, it is of notable importance that the courts
have held the statutes valid without proof of actual damage to
the waters. Logically, there appears no reason why a municipal
ordinance prohibiting the discharge of polluting matter into
the municipality's water supply should not be upheld as a
valid exercise of the police power in the same manner as state
statutes prohibiting similar actions have been sustained.
Differing only in degree from those statutes and ordinances
which prohibit the depositing of contaminating matters into
potable water sources are the enactments forbidding activities
in or on waters used for a water supply. These activities include,
among others, swimming, bathing, boating and fishing. Regulations of the activities of the general public in or on a water
supply, as a rule, have been upheld by the courts. 65 Where
regulations have interfered with private riparian rights to swim,
bathe, boat, or fish, however, there is a clear split of authority
as to the validity of the regulations. Some courts have upheld
restrictions on private water rights for the purpose of maintain-

63 State v. Wheeler, 44 N.J.L. 88 (1882); State v. Griffin, 69 N.H. 1, 39 A. 260 (1896).
Cf. State v. Chemical Co. of America, 90 N.J. Eq. 425, 107 A. 164 (1919); City of Lawrence
v. Commissioners of Public Works, 318 Mass. 520, 62 N.E. (2d) 850 (1945); Sprague v.
Door, 185 -Mass. 10, 69 N.E. 344 (1904); Miles City v. State Board of Health, 39 Mont.
405, 102 P. 696 (1909); Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906); Topeka
Water Supply Co. v. Potwin Place, 43 Kan. 404, 23 P. 578 (1890). But see People v. Elk
River M. & L. Co., 107 Cal. 221, 40 P. 531 (1895), in which the court expresses sympathy
with the riparian loggers as opposed to the needs of the municipality for a pure supply
of water.
64 Durham v. Cotton Mills, 141 N.C. 615, 54 S.E. 453 (1906); State v. Wheeler, 44
N.J.L. 88 (1882); Miles City v. State Board of Health, 39 Mont. 405, 102 P. 696 (1909).
65 Birmingham v. Lake, 243 Ala. 367, 10 S. (2d) 24 (1942); Shreveport v. Conrad, 212
La. 738, 33 S. (2d) 503 (1947); Commonwealth v. Hyde, 230 Mass. 6, 118 N.E. 643 (1918).
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ing the purity of the water for public use. 66 On the other hand,
courts in Michigan, 67 Wisconsin, 68 and Florida69 have held invalid ordinances interfering with private rights to swim, bathe,
or boat in waters used for a public supply.70 The conflict of
cases is clear. A court faced for the first time with the issue
of whether regulation of private rights to protect a p.ublic water
supply is constitutional can find case authority to support either
an affirmative or a negative determination.
Besides control of pollution discharge or boating and swimming, it is often necessary, in order to assure pure water, to
regulate the ways in which lands located within the watershed
of a stream or lake may be used. The purity of a body of water
is not determined solely by what may be thrmvn into it by
persons along the shore or diffused into it by swimmers or
bathers. Streams and lakes are fed by their respective watersheds
with runoff and seepage water. This water will vary in degree
of purity depending upon what materials may be present on or
within the soil of the watershed.
Generally, regulations aimed at eliminating pollution caused
by activities on the lands surrounding the water source, if reason~bly calculated to effectuate the purpose of preserving water
purity, will be upheld by the courts. 71 A minority view was
voiced in the case of George v. Village of Chester.72 In that case
the court held that a village, after condemning a part of a lake for
a water supply, could not enforce a state public health ordinance
against the defendant so as to prohibit him from farming his
land located along the lake. This regulation, in the mind of the
court, would constitute the taking of private property without

66 State v. Morse, 84 Vt. 387, 80 A. 189 (1911); State v. Heller, 123 Conn. 492, 196 A.
337 (1937); State v. Finney, 65 Idaho 630, 150 P. (2d) 130 (1944).
67 People .v. Hulbert, 131 Mich. 156, 91 N.W. 211 (1902). But cf. Battle Creek v.
Resort Assn., 181 Mich. 241, 148 N.W. 441 (1914).
68 Bino v. Hurley, 273 Wis. 10, 76 N.W. (2d) 571 (1956).
69 Pounds v. Darling, 75 Fla. 125, 77 S. 666 (1918).
70 Cf. In re Clinton Water District, 36 Wash. (2d) 282, 218 P. (2d) 309 (1950), where
the court required the city in a condemnation suit to compensate the landowners for
the value of their riparian rights which would be taken away by the operation of a public
health statute applicable when the city used the waters for a public supply.
71 Salt Lake City v. Young, 45 Utah 349, 145 P. 1047 (1915); Ophir v. Ault, 67 Utah
214,247 P. 290 (1926); New York v. Kelsey, 143 N.Y.S. 41 (1913); West Frankfort v. Fullop,
6 Ill. (2d) 609, 129 N.E. (2d) 682 (1955); Durango v. Chapman, 27 Colo. 169, 60 P. 635
(1900); State v. Perley, 249 U.S. 510 (1919), affg. 173 N.C. 783, 92 S.E. 504 (1917).
72111 N.Y.S. 722 (1908).
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compensation.73 In Bountiful City v. De Luca74 the Utah Supreme Court refused to enforce a city ordinance so as to exclude
a sheep herder from pasturing his flock along the city's water
source. The court limited the ordinance to apply only if the
defendant did not use reasonable care to prevent pollution from
the grazing of his sheep. In the Washington decision of In re
Clinton Water District,15 the court required the city to compensate riparians for the decrease in the value of their lands
which would result from the application of state public health
laws when the city began using the water for its municipal
supply.
In both the George and the Bountiful City cases, the court
appears to be bothered by the fact that if the ordinances in
question were upheld or strictly applied, the defendants would
be deprived of the only feasible use of their particular pieces of
land. In effect, the ordinances would do more than regulate
the use of land; they would deprive the owner of his land by
depriving him of the only practical use of it under the circumstances. There is little doubt that the courts deciding the George
and Bountiful City cases would lend a more friendly ear to
regulation which excluded one type of use, but, as a practical
matter, permitted any of several other types of uses to be made of
the property. The Clinton Water District decision may be distinguished on its facts as being an action of condemnation and not
a determination involving the validity of a state or municipal
regulation against pollution of a public water supply; however,
in principle the case denies to the city power to prohibit pollution ·
of its public water supply through use of the state police power.
A city contemplating condemnation for a water supply would
do well to give close consideration to the case and to the possibility that, in an eminent domain proceeding, it will be forced
73 In the George decision, the public health regulation which the village tried to
enforce again5t the defendant provided that the municipal corporation in whose favor
the regulation was invoked was required to pay for any damages resulting from its enforcement. Although the court seemed to hold that the regulation without compensation
would be invalid, it might be argued that the court was influenced by the terms of the
regulation and therefore required the village to compensate the defendant if it intended
to maintain the land use restrictions. See Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183, 29 N.E. 664
(1885); Rockville Water & Aqueduct Co. v. Koelsch, 90 Conn. 171, 96 A. 947 (1916). Both
cases involved statutes which provided for an award of damages to the defendant where
his activity was prevented because it caused damage to the public water supply.
74 77 Utah 107, 292 P. 194 (1930).
75 36 Wash. (2d) 282, 218 P. (2d) 309 (1950).
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to compensate private individuals located on the watershed for
any depreciation in value of their lands due to the prospective
enforcement of existing ordinances or statutes against contamination of public water supplies.76
In summarizing the state of the law relative to the exercise
of police power to protect a city's water supply, the distinction
between a regulation of the general rights of the public and a
regulation of individual property rights must be drawn. Generally, a regulation of the public's rights will be maintained, if
at all reasonable, since no private property is being appropriated.
With reference to legislation which interferes with or eliminates
private rights, in view of the clear-cut division of authority, it
seems fair to conclude that the decision of the court will depend,
not upon abstract principles of law or precedent, but upon the
feelings and beliefs of the individual members of the court. In
jurisdictions where private rights to the use of water have been
firmly entrenched and dutifully respected, it will not be at all
surprising if the courts require a municipality to make use of its
power of eminent domain rather than its police power to safeguard the purity of its water supply.
IV.

WATER DISTRICTS AND

MUNICIPAL PARTICIPATION

A. General Observations. The foregoing parts of this paper
have concerned the legal questions encountered by a municipality
attempting on its own to obtain for itself and its inhabitants a
supply of water either within or without its corporate limits.
· There is, however, a definite trend, as evidenced by state legislative activity, toward cooperation by municipalities as a unit
with other persons or other governmental units in obtaining
a joint supply of water. This may be agreement between municipalities to secure a joint source of supply, or an organized water
district in which the municipality participates as a member.
There are several features of a joint endeavor to obtain a
water supply which make it attractive to a municipality. First,
since the monetary investment necessary to establish an operating
water system is great, particularly where water is difficult to.
acquire, it is often advantageous to pool financial resources,
76 The regulations of land use for the purpose of protecting the purity of water
supplies are very similar to zoning regulations. It is notable that the courts have drawn
no distinction between existing non-conforming uses and future uses as has been done
in the instance of zoning.
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thereby cutting the cost to the individual municipal corporation.77 In this connection, if a municipality acts alone in establishing a reservoir, or other water facility, it will receive no
compensation for any indirect benefits, such as stream flow
regulation, afforded to other governmental units or private individuals. Cooperative endeavors provide for a share of the
cost as well as of the benefit to be apportioned among the participating members. Secondly, a cooperative endeavor engenders
a cooperative spirit between the municipality and its neighbors.
This spirit is most beneficial to a city, town, or village looking
beyond its corporate boundaries for a water supply or water
transportation facilities. Thirdly, a joint venture, particularly
a water district, may permit the exercise of greater powers to
acquire water than usually are possessed by a single municipality.
Fourthly, a joint endeavor often will allow the use of revenue
raising measures separate from the revenue means available to
individual municipalities, thereby providing a method to avoid
the debt or tax limitations imposed on the individual
municipality.78
Legislative enactments providing for the formation of water
supply districts are numerous. For the purposes of this paper,
it is necessary to mention only certain kinds of water districts.
Districts which are formed and operated independently of any
participation by the city, town, or village governing body do
not warrant special consideration, although the area within a
municipality sometimes may be included in the district.79 Even
though not participating in an official manner the municipality
may encourage action by its citizenry through these districts as
a means of bringing water into the area. Nevertheless, from the
viewpoint of a municipal government seeking a water supply
for its inhabitants, a district act which completely ignores the
municipal unit is of little value.
Another type of water supply district is that in which the
77 The condemnation of conflicting water rights, the housing of waterworks facilities,
and the excavation for pipelines are but a few of the instances in which the cost for
jointly operating municipalities will be only slightly more than that for a municipality
acting alone.
78 See 38 AM. JUR., Mun. Corp. §435 (1941); 94 A.L.R. 818 (1935).
79 For examples of water district acts in which the municipal governments are denied
any participation, see Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 82, §§701 to 764; N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953)
§§75-18-1 to 75-18-39; Tenn. Code Ann. (1955; Supp. 1958) §§6-2601 to 6-2627; Idaho
Code Ann. (1947; Supp. 1957) §§42-3201 to 42-3227; Mo. Stat. Ann. (Vernon, 1949) §§247.230
to 247.670.
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municipality plays a part in the formation and/or operation of
the district. In these districts the municipality, through its governing body, works along with other municipalities and individual citizens in bringing potable water into the district area.
A final category of districts includes those which are organized
and managed solely by joint cooperation of two or more municipalities through the governing bodies of the municipal units.
Enactments of the legislatures enabling the formation of water
supply districts which allow or require action by municipal
governments are the ones which will assist the municipality to
answer the growing demand for water by its inhabitants. This
is the type of water district act which deserves careful consideration in a study of the methods available to the municipal
unit to secure a water supply.
B. Districts Allowing Partial Participation by Municipal
Governments. There are two methods commonly employed in
water district acts for permitting a degree of participation in
district affairs to the municipal governments encompassed within the area of the district. Participation may be provided, first, in
the procedure for forming the district or, second, in the provisions for management of the operations of the district. The first
is characterized by a procedural provision permitting the municipality on behalf of its inhabitants to sign the petition,80 initiate
the proceeding,81 or appear at the hearing82 for the formation
of the district. Although district acts vary considerably in their
procedure for establishment, there are several which allow only
this form of participation by the municipal officials and fail to
give further recognition in any other provision to the representatives of the interests of the municipal unit. A municipa_lity
which is seeking active management in the affairs of its water
district needs greater recognition than is afforded by a district
act allowing municipal participation only at the formation level.
When compared with district acts giving no consideration to
the municipal government, an act allowing the municipality to
sign a petition, initiate a proceeding, or appear at the hearing
for or against the establishment of a district provide certain
80 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6101.05; S.D. Laws 1957, c. 492, §5; W. Va.
Code (1955) §1409(38b).
81 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2769(83); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6ll9.02;
N.D. Laws (1957) c. 383, §2.
82 E.g., County Water Districts Act, ll N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1958) §255.
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worthwhile benefits for the city, town, or village having a duty
to acquire and maintain a water supply for its inhabitants. The
municipal unit supplying water or having the general duty of
safeguarding the interests of the people in an adequate supply
of potable water will be aware of the need for additional supplies
at a much earlier time than the individual water user. Municipal
action on a petition for the establishment of a district will
activate, alert, and encourage an otherwise unaware or lethargic
population and thereby avoid a possible water crisis in the future.
Representation of its inhabitants by the municipal corporation
in signing a petition also will eliminate the difficulty of securing
signatures within the municipality thereby facilitating the
organization of a district. Probably, the most important benefit to a municipality from being allowed to initiate by petition
proceedings for the formation of a water district is the opportunity afforded thereby to determine or influence the decision
of what is included in the petition and thereby in the charter of
the district. The Ohio Regional Water and Sewer Districts Act,83
for example, provides that the petition shall set forth the purpose and boundaries of the proposed district and the manner
of selection, number, term, and compensation of the governing
body of the district. 84 It is very possible that under this act a
municipality could secure adequate representation on the board
of directors by having the right to sign the petition on behalf of
its inhabitants.
The second method commonly employed to allow municipal
participation in the affairs of the district is for the municipality to be represented on the board of directors of the water
supply district. District acts in West Virginia,85 Minnesota,86
and Montana87 provide for representation of the municipality as
a unit. The West Virginia act provides that cities of 3,000 to
18,000 population within the district have one representative
on the board and cities over 18,000 population have two representatives. If the number of city representatives totals three
or more, no additional members at large are included. City
representatives are appointed by resolution of the municipal
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §§6119.01 to 6119.42.
§6119.02.
85 Public Service Districts for Water &: Sewage Services Act, W. Va. Code (1955)
§1409(38c).
86 Watershed Act, Minn. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §112.37.
87 County Water Districts Act, Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §16-4506.
83

84 Id.,
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governmental body. In Minnesota, under the Watershed Act,
managers of the board suggested in the petition are selected by
the Water Resources Board as "representative of the local units
of government affected." 88 Montana, in the County Water Districts Act, requires five directors to be elected at large and permits
each mayor of the municipalities included in the district to
appoint one additional representative of the municipality to
the board.
From the viewpoint of a municipality desiring to work
through a local district to obtain a water supply, representation
on the board of directors is very important. Once the municipal government has been designated as the medium for treating
the water supply problems of its people, it should not be supplanted in this duty when a local water district is formed.
C. Districts Composed Solely of Governmental Units. 1. General. In eastern states where much of life's activity is centered
in and about the cities, towns, and villages, the duty of supplying
potable water generally has been assigned to the municipal governments rather than to local water districts organized and
managed by the individual inhabitants of the area. In the eastern states, where once water supplies were considered unlimited,
the task of acquiring additional water for municipal uses is becoming more difficult. For these reasons, groups of municipalities, rather than their inhabitants, are turning toward cooperative endeavors such as water districts to provide the water required for their municipal works. As a result there has been a
recent growth in the number of legislative , acts enabling the
formation of districts organized solely on the basis of municipal
corporations and managed solely through the governing bodies
of the various member municipalities. 89 Typical of this growth
is the enactment by the Michigan legislature of three district
acts for municipalities in a period of three years. 90
88 Note 86
89 Concern

supra.
for the insufficiency of available water in the eastern half of the United
States has brought about a growing demand for legislation not only in the area of municipal water supply development but also in the area of water use law affecting by legislation
the common law doctrine of riparian rights.
90 Charter Water Authorities Act in 1957, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2533(31) to
5.2533(59); Sewage Disposal and Water Supply Districts Act in 1956, Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1958) §§5.2769(81) to 5.2769(92); Sewage Disposal and Water Supply System Authorities
Act in 1955, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2769(51) to 5.2769(64). See also: Municipal Water
Supply Authorities legislation of 1952, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2533(1) to 5.2533(12); The
Metropolitan District Act in 1929, Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2131 to 5.2145.
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2. Joint water supply agreement. The least complex form
of legislation providing for cooperation among municipalities
is that which provides for what may be termed a "joint water
supply agreement." Typical of this form of legislation is a Pennsylvania statute providing that two or more boroughs may
unite in the construction or acquisition and maintenance of a
water supply works. 91 Connecticut, 92 Michigan, 93 and New
York,94 in addition to joint action, permit the cities to appoint
a board to handle the affairs of their joint acquisitions. The
term "district" is misleading since there actually is no new governmental subdivision or district created. The arrangement is
based solely on contracts between municipalities and the only
relation of a joint water supply arrangement to a water district
is the provision, if any, for the appointment of a joint board
to handle the water supply facilities.
The benefit derived from a joint water supply agreement is
primarily that of mutual financial assistance since municipalities
are given no additional powers under the enabling legislation
to facilitate the acquisition of a water supply other than the
power to cooperate and contract with one another and the
power to hold property jointly. The statutes are most important,
however, in eliminating any question which might be raised
concerning the power of a particular city to enter into such an
agreement with another municipal government.
3. Municipal water districts. The joint water supply agreement has certain definite advantages for the cooperating municipal membership; nevertheless it is not nearly as popular or useful as a metropolitan water district. A metropolitan water district is a separate political subdivision of the state formed by
the governing bodies of two or more existing governmental units95
for the purpose of obtaining a water supply. The only territory
91 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §47435. See also Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24,
§75-1; N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§160-191.6 to 160-191.10.
92 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §§344d to 346d, as amended by Pub. Act. No. 13,
§35 (1957).
93 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2532(1) to 5.2532(5).
94 23 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1954) §§110-117.
95 Several of the water district acts discussed in this section envisage the formation of
districts composed not only of cities, towns, and villages but also of counties, townships,
and even special districts. In some states, the district acts are sufficiently broad to permit
the association of more than one district forming a new and larger district unit. In
other states, the language of the acts would exclude participation by water districts. For
example, see the North Carolina Water and Sewer Authorities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann.
(Supp. 1957) §§162A-2(e) and 162A-3 which permit a district to be formed by two or more
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of the district is that contained within the corporate limits of
the constituent members. Legislation permitting water districts
to be formed on the basis of governmental units has been enacted
in Connecticut,96 Delaware,97 Maryland, 98 Michigan, 99 New Mexico,100 North Carolina,101 Pennsylvania, 102 Utah, 103 Virginia,104 Washington, 105 and Wisconsin. 106 _ A metropolitan water
district, in four states, 107 is formed by resolution or ordinance of
the governing body of each included governmental unit approving the establishment of a district and adopting a charter or
articles of incorporation. In five states108 a metropolitan water
district is formed on the basis of a vote in favor of the district and
its charter by a majority of the inhabitants of each governmental
unit concerned. The Virginia act requires an election within any
particular unit only if ten percent of the voters demand it.109
Michigan has two acts requiring a vote of the people and two
permitting organization by the governing bodies of the political
units. 110

political subdivisions which include cities, towns, incorporated villages, counties, sanitation
districts, and other political subdivisions or public corporations of the state. Compare
the New Mexico Water Supply Associations Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §14-40-75,
which includes only incorporated cities, towns and villages. In this paper, the term
"governmental units" rather than "municipal units" is used so as to include all of the
possible member governments instead of cities, towns, and villages only.
96 Metropolitan District Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1955) §§347d-353d, as amended
by Pub. Act No. 13, §36 (1957).
97 Water and/or Sewer Authorities Act, Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) tit. 16, §§14011421.
98 Water and/or Sewer Authorities Act, Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §§445-466.
99 Metropolitan District Act, Charter Water Authorities Act, Municipal Water Supply
Authorities legislation, Sewage Disposal and Water Supply System Authorities Act, note
90 supra.
100 Water Supply Associations Act, N.M. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§14-40-'75 to 14-40-90.
101 Water and Sewer Authorities Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §§162A-1 to
162A-19.
102 Municipality Authorities Act of 1945, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957} tit. 53J
§§301-322.
103 Metropolitan Water Districts Act, Utah Code Ann. (1953; Supp. 1957) §§73-8-1 to
73-8-55.
104 Water and Sewer Authorities Act, Va. Code. (1956 repl.; Supp. 1958) §§15-764.l to
15-764.32.
105 Metropolitan Municipal Corporations Act, Wash. Laws (1957) c. 213.
106 Municipal Water Districts Act, Wis. Stat. (195'7) §198.22.
107 Maryland, New Mexico, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.
108 Connecticut, Delaware, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
100 Note 104 supra, at §15-764.6.
110 Note 90 supra. Metropolitan District Act and the Charter Water Authorities Act
require approval by the electorate of each governmental component; Sewage Disposal
and Water Supply System Authorities Act and the Municipal Water Supply Authorities
legislation permit organization by the governmental bodies without an election.
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Although in the establishment of a metropolitan water district, practical considerations will dictate that the component
governmental units be located in the same general area, the
existing legislation usually does not require that the units forming the district be adjacent to one another. It is possible, therefore, for municipalities separated by farming areas, for instance,
to work together through a district even though the intervening
farmers are in no way interested in a water supply district. On
the other hand, most of the district acts provide for cooperation
by governmental units rather than by cities, towns, and villages
only. 111 In this way, a municipality which is distant from any
other city, town, or village, nevertheless may cooperate with
the county or township in which the municipality is situated.
All states which have passed enabling legislation for the
establishment of water supply districts composed solely of governmental units have provided that the district board of directors
be composed of representatives from the various member units.
A majority of the statutes provide expressly that the chief executive or governing body of the political unit appoint its representative. The other statutes allow the manner of selection and appointment of directors to be determined by the component municipalities in the charter or articles of incorporation.
In the district acts which set forth the manner of representation
on the board, it is customary for each component unit, in addition
to its one representative, to be granted extra representatives on
the basis of property evaluation or water consumption within the
particular unit. 112 By granting additional votes to larger governmental units, it is possible to provide a relatively equitable representation of all members' interests.U3 Some of the statutes are
silent as to the withdrawal from the district by a municipality;
however, others set forth a procedure for withdrawal similar to
that provided for joining the district.
To the municipal government which has the duty of furnish111 Note 95 supra.
112 In Michigan Charter

Water Authorities Act, note 90 supra, at §5.2533(36),
and in the Utah act, note 103 supra, at §73-8-20, as amended, the voting strength of
individual representatives is increased by one vote on the basis of property evaluation
within their respective governmental units. In Washington, note 105 supra, at §12, a
detailed listing of representation is set forth. Wisconsin, note 106 supra, at §198.22(4a),
grants additional votes to representatives of the governmental bodies on the basis of
water consumption within the particular governmental unit.
113 The North Carolina act requires one director to be appointed by the state governor, note 101 supra, at §162A-5.
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ing water to its inhabitants, a district formed by the governmental
units and a board of directors appointed by the constituent municipal governing bodies and responsible directly thereto is a
most satisfactory method of establishing and operating the water
district. In this way the district becomes the medium whereby
the municipality, by appointing skilled and competent representatives, may further its aim and fulfill its duty of acquiring
water for its people.
D. District Powers and Financing. In each of the district acts
providing for partial or total participation by the municipal unit,
the general powers granted to the district are sufficiently extensive to accomplish the purposes of the organization. All of the
acts permit the acquisition of property by the district, and certain acts delegate expressly to the district power to acquire by
purchase or eminent domain property beyond the district boundaries.114 In states where district acts do not grant extraterritorial
powers, court interpretation of the act must be relied upon to
furnish these powers. Thus, the district, and the municipality
acting through the district, face the same legal problems and
questions regarding extraterritorial powers as does the individual
municipality when it seeks to go beyond its corporate limits for
a water supply.
In establishing the water district acts, no legislature has seen
fit to delegate to the districts created general police power for the
protection of their waters or facilities. The district is handicapped
within and without its limits since it. has no police power whatsoever. The district must rely on general statutes of the state to
protect its waters and facilities. Besides state legislation it is possible that, in the interest of the health, safety, and general welfare of its own population, a municipality which is a member of
the district and in whose borders the district facilities are located
could use its own police power to protect the district's water
and equipment from harm.
Since a most important aspect of the water district is its potential financing benefits to the municipalities associating therewith, a city contemplating the formation of, or association with,
a water district will be much concerned with the financing structure and powers of the district. It would be beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss the many details of the financial structure of
114

E.g., Wis. Stat. (1957) §198.12(1).
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the various water district acts and since problems of financing
and taxation are peculiar to the individual states it would serve
very little purpose. There are, however, certain features of the
revenue provisions which are common to many of the acts.
In establishing the district acts, the legislatures almost always
have provided two standard financing devices for the district.
These revenue measures include (I) the power to fix and collect
charges for services and (2) the power to issue bonds. 115 Service
charges may be fixed without the approval of the electorate; however, some statutes require the rates to be reasonable, 116 uniform, 117 or equitable.118 Other statutes provide expressly that the
rates charged are to be determined solely by the district board of
directors.U 0 The power to issue bonds for major improvements
generally is vested in the discretion of the board of directors, but
a few jurisdictions require that the question of bond financing
be submitted to the electorate. 120
In addition to granting power to charge for services and issue
bonds, many of the statutes grant taxing power to the district. 121
In some the power to tax is relatively unlimited; in others it can
be used only for certain designated purposes. 122 A few statutes
grant the power to levy special assessments123 while two others
grant to the district power to charge tapping fees. 124 The Washington Metropolitan Municipal Corporations Act provides for
the levy of a charge each year against the municipalities that comprise the district to furnish "supplemental income" for the district to pay the expenses which cannot be met by the other
E.g., Va. Code (Supp. 1958) §15-764.12(g).
Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6101.24; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 43, §450(K);
Del. Code Ann. (Supp. 1956) tit. 16, §1406(Il).
117 Md. Code Ann., note 116 supra; Del. Code Ann., note Il6 supra.
118 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §73-8-21(8).
110 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §306(h); N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957)
§162A-6(i).
120 Utah Code Ann. (1953) §73-8-22. Michigan Charter Water Authorities Act, note
90 supra, at §5.2533(44a), requires an election on the issue of bonds if demanded by two
percent of the voters within the district. Wash. Laws (1957) c. 213, §45, requires an election
whenever the district officers desire to issue general obligation bonds for capital improvements. Cf. §46 concerning revenue bonds for purposes other than capital improvements.
121 Michigan Charter Water Authorities Act, note 90 supra, at §§5.2533(46) and (48);
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §6Il9.06(M); Utah Code Ann. (Supp. 1957) §73-8-18(i).
122 The Michigan provisions, note 121 supra, permit trucing to pay interest on bonded
indebtedness and for administrative expenses.
123 Note 105 supra, at §50; Michigan Metropolitan District Act, note 90 supra, at
§5.2134(e); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. (Page, 1953) §§6101.48, 6119.06(M).
124 Note 98 supra, at §450(q); note 97 supra, at §1406(17).
115

116 Ohio
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sources of revenue. 125 This revenue device is a further recognition of the municipal government as the basis of the district
rather than individual landowners.
E. Summary. Water supply district legislation enacted to facilitate cooperative effort in acquiring potable water and permitting either partial or total participation by the city as a governmental unit is not new or revolutionary. There are sufficient complete acts with substantial similarity to furnish adequate precedent and assistance to a legislature which is conside'ring the adoption of such an act or to a city pressing for this legislation.
A city which has the municipal function of supplying its inhabitants with water should examine available district legislation
carefully before acting to make certain that the city will be adequately represented in the affairs of the district. Where the prime
interest of the city is to acquire additional water to be furnished
to its inhabitants through its existing facilities, the city's interests
will not be represented or protected by a board of directors elected
at large from the district area. On the other hand, complete
representation of the municipality may not be possible since lack
of sufficient interest or official responsibility on the part of adjacent units of government may force the municipality to operate within a district composed of individual landowners instead
of official governmental units. Once a municipality is assured of
adequate representation in the operation of the district, it must
consider the benefits accruing from associating with individuals
or groups outside its corporate limits as opposed to acting alone.
Present district acts do not provide any powers facilitating the acquisition of a water supply in addition to those already possessed
by most individual municipal corporations. However, the powers
granted to the district to provide for the financing of a cooperative water supply system more often than not will prove attractive and beneficial to the participating municipality.

V. WATER CONSERVATION FOR FUTURE MUNICIPAL NEEDS
A. General Observations. As the population increases and the
economy expands, a greater amount of land once classified as
rural or undeveloped is being subdivided for residential purposes
or utilized for industrial location. These developments add to
the over-all demand for water supply, and, at the same time, by
125

Note 105 supra, at §41.
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their unregulated location, eliminate or destroy possible sites for
the conservation of water supplies to answer their demand. The
trend toward urbanization is pushing water supply sites farther
and farther away from the reach of the central municipality, and
large tracts of land once spotted with municipalities are growing
rapidly into vast metropolitan areas.
The problem created by this expanding development, from
the viewpoint of public health, safety, and general welfare, is
that future sites for water development and conservation are being destroyed. Since the water areas are numbered and the quantity of water is limited, the unthinking destruction of water conservation areas increases the danger of water shortage and brings
nearer the day of water rationing.
·
Haphazard land development has been recognized for many
years as undesirable and detrimental to the public interest. In
addition to eminent domain, land use planning and comprehensive zoning regulations have been employed to restrict the careless utilization of land. Although generally concerned only with
the location of streets and parks, the size and location of structures, and the restriction of certain businesses and occupations,
comprehensive planning and zoning action represents the most
feasible method, short of eminent domain, available for conserving and protecting sources of water and areas for water development in the future.
B. Land Use Planning. Legislation providing for the initiation of land use planning by a governmental unit contemplates
the systematic working out of a proposed developmental scheme
for a particular area, culminating usually in the production of a
master or comprehensive plan.126 This plan then serves as a guide
for the legislative body of the local governmental unit in enacting
zoning legislation as well as in placing public buildings, parks,
streets, etc. Actually, the most important value of land use planning is that it guides the actions of the local legislators; nevertheless, planning statutes have a bearing on the problem of conserving desirable water development sites.
Planning statutes provide for the appointment by the municipality of a planning commission empowered to develop a master
plan for the municipal area including territory outside the mu126 Cf. Village of Lynbrook v. Cadoo, 252 N.Y. 308, 169 N.E. 394 (1929); Call Bond
& Mortgage Co. v. Sioux City, 219 Iowa 572, 259 N.W. 33 (1935).
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nidpal limits which bears a relation to planning within the municipality.127 This plan reflects the proposed general development
in terms of residential, commercial, and industrial use, and also
sets out specific areas for the future location of streets, public
parks, public buildings, and improvements.128 The language of
the statutes is sufficiently broad to include planning for the location of water reservoir sites and water supply areas. 129 Once
adopted by the municipal legislature, this plan becomes the official guide for future location of public buildings and improvements.130 By adopting the plan, the municipality has given official
notice of its intention to take specific areas by purchase or condemnation in the future.r The effect of this notice is to cloud, in
an unofficial manner, the title of the land to be taken and to discourage thereby the development of the land.131 Accordingly, the
area likely will not be greatly developed until the municipality
acquires it for the designated public purpose. This indirect
method of reservation, however, is effective only as to lands that
ultimately will be taken for public use. Development in the general watershed area not designated for condemnation will be unaffected by the adoption of a master plan. ·
C. Land Reservation by Statutory Procedure. The adoption
of a master plan may provide in an extra-legal way for the preservation of desirable sites for future public improvements; how127 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §30653
(second class cities); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.044(1)
(first class cities); Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SID; Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (Deering,
1958) §65-460.
128 E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §30653
(second class cities); N.H. Rev. Stat. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.046 (first
class cities); Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SID.
120 Note 127 supra. Some statutes provide expressly for designation of the general
location and extent of facilities for water supply. E.g., Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.2996;
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:13; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.046 (first class cities).
· 130 E.g., statutes requiring approval of location of public improvements and buildings by the planning commission after an official plan has been adopted: Mich. Stat. Ann.
(1958) §§5.2999, 5.3000; Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.059 (first class cities), 100.680 (third,
fourth, fifth, and sixth class cities); Cal. Govt. Code Ann. (Deering, 1958) §§65549-65553.
Some statutes limit municipal action only as to the location of public streets and highways.
E.g., Mass. Laws Ann. (1952) c. 41, §SIG. Even without statutes expressly requiring the
municipality to follow a master plan, the efforts and conclusions of the municipal planning commission represented in the plan coupled with official adoption of the plan by
the local governing body renders the plan a clear indicator of the future actions of the
municipality. In planning the private development of land, it would be most unwise to
ignore the directions of the master plan solely on the basis that the plan need not be
followed by the municipal governing body.
131 See Cram, "Master Planning Creates Clouds on Titles," 35 MICH. ST. B. J. 9 (April
1956).
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ever, most states have provided a statutory method for the official
reservation of lands for certain public purposes. For the most
part, the statutes apply only to the reservation of lands for future
use as streets and highways; nevertheless, they deserve consideration as possible methods which may be used in future legislative
enactments to secure the reservation of lands for water development and conservation.
A majority of the states, having provided for the establishment
of a municipal planning commission, 132 permit the municipality
to pass an ordinance prohibiting the granting of a building
permit for any structure to be located on the land charted for
use in th~ future as a public street or highway. 133 Provision is
made, however, for granting permits for the location of structures in areas marked for public taking if the property will not
yield a reasonable return to the owner unless such permit is
granted, or if "the grant of such permit is required by considerations of justice and equity." 134
The Michigan act, in addition to the preservation of future
street sites, allows the municipality to deny a permit for building
in "any park, playground or other public grounds." 135 New
Jersey, in addition to street sites, permits the municipality to
prohibit buildings in a "drainage right of way." 136 It is possible
under the Michigan act to argue that sites for the future storage
and development of a water supply may be protected under the
language "public grounds." 137 These statutes, however, are uncommon, since in the majority of states the provisions are limited
to a denial of building permits for construction in street sites.
The statutes give no clear delegation of power to the munici~32 It should be noted that the municipal planning commissions generally have the
duty not only to formulate a master plan but also to develop charts and plats detailed
as to the exact location of public improvem~nts. Statutes allowing the denial of permits
for building on certain lands refer to the lands charted on a detailed plat and not to
those lands designated for future use on the general master plan only.
133 E.g., Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §§31, 32; 20 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney,
1951) §35; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:30.
134 N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. (1955) §36:31. A provision similar in content to the New
Hampshire statute appears as part of all statutes allowing permits to be denied for
building on lands charted for future municipal acquisition.
135 Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §5.3007(4).
136 N .J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-1.38. Drainage right-of-way means the "lands
required for the installation of storm water sewers or drainage ditches or required along
a natural stream or watercourse for preserving the channel and providing for the flow
of water therein to safeguard the public against flood damage.•••" Id. at §40:55-1.31.
137 Note 135 supra.
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palities to control building in proposed streets or public grounds
outside the municipal limits. 138 In some states where the master
plan may include areas outside the municipality bearing a relation to the municipal planning, it is possible to argue, under
the particular language of the statutes, that the adopting of a
detailed plat of proposed streets based on the master plan gives
to the municipality power to plat land for streets outside its
limits and regulate building on such land.139
With the growing need to conserve and protect areas suited
for the development and storage of water supplies, new legislation enabling local units of government to conserve these areas
will become imperative. Denying permits for building seems
to be a practical and useful solution. However, in view of the
constitutional prohibition against the taking of property for a
public purpose without compensation, it must be recognized
that there are limitations on the power of the municipality to
prohibit building in areas designated for public use. Substantial
or total depreciation in the value or use of a person's lands by
reason of the denial of a building permit will render the denial
unconstitutional, thereby necessitating the granting of a permit.140
In two jurisdictions at least, Kentucky141 and Pennsylvania,142
a statutory scheme has been devised to enable a municipality
to reserve lands for future street use without violating the constitutional rights of the landowner. The municipality, having
designated on its official plats the location of future streets and
highways, is entitled to have these locations reserved upon the
payment of compensation as determined by a board of appraisers.
Reservation of the lands for future streets does not in any way
188 But cf. Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951 repl.) §53-754 which allows the municipality
to deny an "improvement location permit" for building in certain areas outside municipal
limits if the unincorporated area outside the boundaries is not subject to existing county
planning.
139 Cf. Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2996, 5.3007(1), 5.3007(4).
140 With the exception of cases in New York, there is a scarcity of cases on the
question of the constitutionality of the denial of permits in particular instances. See
Rand v. City of New York, 155 N.Y.S. (2d) 753 (1956), concerning substantial interference
with landowner's use of his property; Roer Constr. Corp. v. New Rochelle, 136 N.Y.S.
(2d) 414 (1954), where the entire property of a landowner was charted for highway purposes. In both cases, the court held that the denial of a building permit to the landowners constituted a taking of property without just compensation and was unconstitutional. Cf. note 166 infra.
141 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.790 to 100.830 (relates to third, fourth, fifth, and
sixth class cities).
142 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §§22777-22779 (relates to second class cities).
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impair or limit the lawful use of the land by the owner, including
the construction of buildings thereon. However, when the land
is finally taken for the public use, no compensation is granted for
the taking or injury of any structure built during the reservation
period.143
The compensatory scheme has certain advantages over the
system of reserving lands through a denial of building permits.
By compensating the owner, any and all lands desired by the
municipality may be placed on reserve. A building permit may
be denied without compensating the owner only if there is no
substantial injury to the landowner. Further, under the compensation plan, structures erected on the land during the period
of reservation do not add to the cost of condemnation since their
value is not recoverable. 144 If regulation is carried out through
denial of building permits, any variance which was necessitated
under the terms of the statutes increases the cost of condemnation
when the municipality finally takes the land.145
The compensatory system of land reservation, of course, is
not without difficulties. First, compensating the owner for reservation of his land presents a financial burden for the municipality which traditionally has insufficient funds to manage
properly municipal affairs. Secondly, the statutory provisions,
by permitting continued lawful use of the reserved land by the
owner, open the door to possible destruction of the land for the
public use intended. This danger is not very great when the
intended use is for street construction, but it will increase if
this statutory scheme is applied as a method to reserve lands
for purposes of the conservation of natural resources.
D. Zoning. I. Legislative delegation of zoning power. Before
a municipality can consider the feasibility of zoning in order
to conserve and protect a water source area, it must possess the
delegated power to zone for this purpose. Zoning constitutes an
exercise of the police power of the state,146 which power is not
148 The Kentucky provision allows reservation of land located as far as five miles
from the municipal corporate limits. [Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.790, 100.720]. The Pennsylvania act covers only land located within the municipal limits.
144 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §100.830; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1957) tit. 53, §22779.
145 In re Southern Boulevard, Borough of Bronx, City of New York, 262 App. Div.
263, 28 N.Y.S. (2d) 386 (1941); Platt v. City of New York, 92 N.Y.S. (2d) 138, revd. on
other grounds, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S. (2d) 738 (1949). Cf. Matter of City of New
York, 196 N.Y. 255, 89 N.E. 814 (1909).
146 Leary v. Adams, 226 Ala. 472, 147 S. 391 (1933); State v. Valz, 117 Fla. 311, 157
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inherent within the general powers of the municipal government. Zoning power must be delegated by state constitution or
statute, or municipal charter.147 Without an expressed delegation
of power, the municipality cannot enact zoning regulations or
restrictions.
State legislatures have seen fit to grant zoning power to
municipalities, realizing the need and importance of this function to orderly land development. The power has been limited
to lands located within the municipal limits. Extraterritorial
zoning power generally has not been granted, although, as has
been noted, delegations of power enabling the municipality to
preserve the purity of its existing extraterritorial water supplies
are now quite common.148
Power to enact zoning restrictions within the municipal
limits must be construed in accordance with the terms of the
legislative delegation of power. Municipal power to zone is
limited and controlled by the provisions of the legislative grant.149
Statutes delegating zoning power generally contain two separate
provisions which are relevant here: (I) a list of objects and
activities which may be regulated, and (2) a list of purposes for
which regulations may be imposed. As to the first, municipalities
traditionally may regulate the height ~nd size of buildings and
other structures, the percentage of the lot to be occupied, the
size of yards, courts, and open spaces, the density of population
and the location and use of buildings, structures, and land for
trade, industry, residences and other purposes. 150 With reference
to the purposes for which zoning regulations may be enacted,
the statutes provide that regulations may be imposed to protect
and preserve the public health, safety, and general welfare, as
S. 651 (1934); Chicago v. Clark, 359 Ill. 374, 194 N.E. 537 (1935); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio
St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925); Kroner v. Portland, 116 Ore. 141, 240 P. 536 (1925).
147 Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.'E. (2d) 164 (1946); Clements v. McCabe, 210
Mich. 207, 177 N.W. 722 (1920); 8 McQUILI.IN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, 3d ed., §25.35
(1957). Legislative delegation of zoning powers to a municipality is constitutional. Brady
v. Keene, 90 N.H. 99, 4 A. (2d) 658 (1939).
148 Section 11-E supra. See RHYNE, MUNICIPAL I.Aw 321-322 (1957), regarding the few
examples of extraterritorial zoning powers.
149 Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141 P. (2d) 704 (1943); Brown v. Board
of Appeals, 327 III. 644, 159 N;E. 225 (1927); 122 Main Street Corp. v. Brockton, 323
Mass. 646, 84 N.E. (2d) 13 (1949); Kass v. Hedgpeth, 226 N.C. 405, 38 S.E. (2d) 164 (1946);
Holzhauer v. Ritter, 184 Wis. 35, 198 N.W. 852 (1924).
150 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §73-1; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §21; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1955) §31:60; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-30; Pa.. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1957) tit. 53, §14752.
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well as to lessen traffic congestion, secure safety from fires, provide adequate light and air, prevent overcrowding and facilitate
adequate provision of transportation, water, sewerage, schools,
parks, and other public requirements. 151
Zoning power, as delegated to the municipalities, is limited
to the regulation of specified objects and activities for certain
stipulated purposes.152 If the preservation of water development
sites cannot be accomplished in a practical manner by means of
the specific regulations and restrictions provided in the statutes,
or if the safeguarding of water sites is not a lawful purpose for
which zoning may be utilized, the zoning power will furnish no
solution to the problem of dissappearing water source areas. 153
The statutory listing of objects and activities which may be
regulated is broad, and appears adequate to permit the regulation
and restriction of undesirable development in the area proposed
for water conservation or storage. Regulation of the size of yards
and courts, coupled with regulation of the density of population,
if necessary, provides a useful way of facilitating drainage in the
area and preserving the watershed. From the viewpoint of safeguarding water development areas, the most appropriate type
of regulation permitted under the delegation of zoning powers
is the regulation of the use of land and structures for trade, industry, residences, and other purposes. Through this type of
regulation, the municipality is able to exclude from the water
conservation area businesses which would tend to destroy the
water supply by pollution as well as activities on the land which
might be detrimental to the area as a good watershed.
In listing the promotion of health, safety, and general welfare as one of the purposes for which zoning may be exercised,
the legislatures have delegated to municipalities power to zone
to the fullest extent and for the widest purpose consistent with
constitutional principles. Preservation of existing potable water
supplies clearly is in the interest of the public health, safety,
and general welfare. There is no doubt that conservation of our
natural resources for man's future use is within the statutory
151 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 24, §73-1; Md. Code Ann. (1957) art. 66B, §21; N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. (1955) §31:62; N.J. Stat. Ann. (Supp. 1957) §40:55-32; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon,
1957) tit. 53, §14754.
152 Notes 150, 151 supra.
153 The ability of the municipality to zone legally must be construed according to
the terms of the legislative grant of power. Note 149 supra.
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provision permitting zoning to be utilized for the purpose of
public health, safety, and general welfare. 154 Nevertheless, it
must be pointed out that, although justified as protecting
the public health, safety, and general welfare, the conservation of natural resources generally has not been considered
the purpose of zoning regulations. Ac; evidenced by the particular
purposes set forth in the statutes delegating power, zoning traditionally has been used for the purpose of avoiding slums and
maintaining healthful and attractive residential areas. Whether,
under traditional statutes granting zoning powers, a court will
allow zoning for conservation purposes is a matter for speculation.155 However, if a court is apprised of the necessity for
conserving natural resources, the provision in the statutes delegating power to zone in the interest of the public health, safety,
and general welfare is sufficient to allow the municipality to
zone to preserve sources of potable water for future use.
In a few states, the legislatures, in delegating zoning powers
to local governmental units, have recognized the possible use of
zoning to conserve natural resources. 156 These states provide expressly that zoning regulations may be enacted for conservation
154 Hudson Water Co. v. Mccarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), the right of New Jersey to
prohibit transportation of water from New Jersey streams to New York was upheld as
a valid use of the police power to protect the waters of New Jersey. Cf. In re Willow
Creek, 74 Ore. 592, 144 P. 505 (1914). See Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300
(1920), concerning preservation of natural gas; Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190
(1900); Henderson Co. v. Thompson, 300 U.S. 258 (1937), restricting the use of sweet
gas; Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), affg. 110 Cal. App. 123,
293 P. 899 (1930), upholding as a valid police regulation the California conservation
statute. This statute is now found at Cal. Pub. Res. Code Ann. (Deering, 1954; Supp.
1957) §§3000 et seq.; Richfield Oil Corp. v. Crawford, 39 Cal. (2d) 729, 249 P. (2d) 600
(1952), permitting the legislature to provide for the prevention of the waste of oil and
gas; Julian Oil & Royalties Co. v. Capshaw, 145 Okla. 237, 292 P. 841 (1930); comment,
19 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 416 (1931).
155 Although the statutes delegating zoning power to municipalities set forth the
protection of the public health, safety, and general welfare as a legitimate purpose for
which the zoning power may be exercised, this general purpose is listed with other more
specific purposes which are all directed toward the preservation or establishment of
'healthful conditions in the specific area which is zoned. Under the rule of statutory
construction, ejusdem generis, the general purpose would be interpreted in the light of,
or -limited by, the specific purposes enumerated.
156 Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1951 repl.) §53-756(5) provides that a municipality may
"classify and designate the rural lands amongst agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential and other uses and purposes." Va. Code Ann. (1956 repl.) §15-844 allows
counties to zone "for the purpose of promoting health, safety, order, prosperity, the
conservation of natural resources and the general welfare." Minn. Stat. Ann. (1947)
§§396.01, 396.03(5), permit certain counties to zone "to conserve and develop natural
resources." See also Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1956) tit. 16, §§2026, 5226 (counties); Wis.
Stat. Ann. (1957) §§60.74(1), 60.74(3) (towns); Mich. Stat. Ann. (1958) §§5.2961(1), 5.2963(1)
(county and township).
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purposes. The Georgia statute, for example, states that municipalities may adopt zoning regulations for the purpose, among
others, of "conserving and developing the natural resources." 1117
Provisions of this type extend the traditional concept of zoning
purposes and clearly may serve as a basis for conserving areas for
a water supply and for water development sites for future use.
Statutes similar to the Georgia enactment are not very common,
however, and, of the few state statutes existing, most are limited
to zoning by authorities in the counties where most undeveloped
land is located.158
2. Extraterritorial zoning power. Since municipalities generally
have not been granted power to zone beyond their corporate
limits, the most direct method available for a municipality to accomplish extraterritorial zoning is to cooperate with governmental units controlling the outside territory. 159 Often this cooperation will be informal, without statutory basis. On the other hand,
statutory authorization may exist, as in Illinois, for the cooperation of local units of government in matters pertaining to the
zoning of land in the general area of the municipality. 160 This
authorization, however, in no way grants to a municipal unit
power to enforce the zoning of areas beyond its corporate limits.
The most detailed method provided by statute for the cooperation of a municipality with outside governmental units is a
provision, as in Kentucky, for the establishment of a city-county
planning and zoning commission.161 This commission has the
power to prepare for the area within and without the municipal
boundaries a comprehensive development plan including a master plan, a zoning plan and regulations and restrictions relating
thereto, and a subdivision control plan.162 Before the comprehensive plan with its zoning regulations and restrictions becomes effective, it must be approved by both the county and the city governing bodies.163
1111 Ga. Code Ann. (1957)
1118 Note 156 supra. For a

§69.802.
consideration of rural zoning, see Warp, "The Legal Status
of Rural Zoning," 36 Iu.. L. REV. 153 (1941).
159 For a discussion of extraterritorial zoning by a municipality, see Bouwsma, "The
Validity of Extraterritorial Municipal Zoning," 8 VAND. L. REv. 806 (1954); Bartelt,
"Extraterritorial Zoning: Reflections on Its Validity," 32 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 367 (1957).
160 III. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 34, §152n. See a similar provision at Ga. Code Ann. (1957)
§69-807.
161 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1956) §§100.031-100.098 (county with first class city), 100.320-100.490
(county with second class city).
102 Id. at §§100.044, 100.350.
163 Id. at §§100.048, 100.400-100.410.
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A city-county planning and zoning commission is the most
effective and efficient· method now available whereby a municipality may effect extraterritorial zoning. From the viewpoint of
·the· municipality, the lack of extraterritorial zoning powers restricts municipal activities and interferes with planning. On the
other hand, in the interest of the orderly and balanced development of an entire area of which the municipality is only a part,
it is desirable to "restrain" the municipality by preventing it
from controlling the lands beyond its borders. The city-county
commission allows the municipality to place before the county
governing body, through the municipal representatives, plans
and suggestions for regulation of lands outside the corporate limits. On the other hand, a joint commission, subject to the county
officials as well as municipal authorities, provides representation
and protection for the persons and lands beyond municipal
borders.
The zoning power whether exercised by an inter-governmental organization or by a governmental unit outside the municipality, must be delegated by the state to the local unit. This delegation of power must be examined to determine whether it may
be used by the local unit for the purpose of conserving the disappearing water development sites. Legal issues as to the scope of
the delegated power are the same whether the power is exercised by a municipality within its limits or by a county or intergovernmental body outside the municipal limits.
· 3. Reasonableness of zoning regulations. If, in the interest of
the public health, safety, and general welfare, action to conserve
sources of potable water for the future requirements of a populace is permitted as a proper purpose of zoning, the sole issue remaining is what particular restrictions or regulations will be permitted. Because of the great divergence of factual settings, it is
impossible to suggest in detail what specific regulations will be required to preserve effectively the natural water source area. The
law as to the validity of a zoning regulation is the same as that of
any police· measure, namely, the regulation must be reasonable
under the· c;:ircumstances.164 Determinations of the reasonableness of zoning regulations are controlled by the facts in each instance.165 Probably a regulation aimed at keeping industry, which
164 58 AM. JUR., Zoning §14 (1948), and cases cited therein.
165 Bacon v. Walker, 204 U.S. 311 (1907); Wulfsohn v. Burden,

241 N.Y. 288, 150
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would pollute the future water source, out of the area of the water
supply would be held reasonable. On the other hand, restrictions
freezing completely the development of the area probably would
be held unconstitutional as constituting a taking of property
without compensation. 166 Between these extremes, the validity or
invalidity of particular zoning restrictions will depend on the
facts in the individual case.
E. Summary. A municipality desiring to preserve and protect
waters and water development sites for future use must be concerned (1) with the protection of particular parcels of land for future condemnation, and (2) with the conservation of lands located
in the general area of the chosen sites. With reference to property
destined for acquisition, the municipality is interested not only in
maintaining it in a condition fit for future public use but also in
preventing development which would add to the cost of acquisition. The prime interest in lands surrounding the future public
site is to regulate and restrict activities on those lands which may
have a detrimental effect on the water supply or water development site.
Statutory delegations of power to municipalities which permit control and protection of lands marked for future condemnation exist as part of the planning and charting powers of the
municipal corporation. The most common power is that allowing
the municipality to deny building permits for construction in
areas marked for future public use. On the other hand, the most
effective power to reserve lands, presenting fewer constitutional
difficulties, is that afforded by a statutory system providing for
compensation to the owner for the reservation of his land. Both
powers are now limited to regulation of land designated for street
construction. With expansion, these systems may provide valuable
assistance to the municipality trying to protect, for future condemnation, water supply and development areas.
The most feasible method available for regulating lands in the
N.E. 120 (1925); Miller v. Board of Public Works, 195 Cal. 477, 234 P. 381 (1925); Senefsky
v. Huntington Woods, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W. (2d) 387 (1943).
·
166 See Henle v. Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258 at 264, 125 N.E. (2d). 355 (1954), where_
the court stated: "The claim that the city has the right to 'freeze' plaintiff's property,
preventing her from its beneficial use until the city gets around to appropriating it for
public purposes as a part of the Lakeland Freeway, is without foundation. If the city
needs the property in that development, then an immediate· proceeding in eminent domain
would end this lawsuit."·
·
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general area of the future public water supply or development is
zoning. Through the zoning power, reasonable regulations may
be imposed to avoid development in the area of the future public improvement which will prove detrimental to the site for the
public use intended to be made of it. In most states, however, it
is not settled whether the conservation of natural resources is a
purpose, within "the legislative grant of power, for which a municipality may exercise its zoning powers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussion, both of case and statute law, reveals
that municipalities generally are well equipped to secure and protect a water supply for their inhabitants. Where, in some states,
adequate powers for the municipality are lacking, they can be
supplied with ease by legislative grant. Even in the field of future
water needs, the municipalities may be able, and, with legislative
delegation of authority, will be able, to protect and reserve water
source areas and water development sites for future use without
condemnation.
An increase in power enabling the municipality to reach out
and take or reserve potable water supplies is a logical method of
answering the growing demands for water within municipal
boundaries. Yet as the demands for more and more water increase
and the great water source areas dwindle before the encroaching
urban population, it is time to question the feasibility and wisdom of continuing to arm small local segments of the government
with extensive uncontrolled powers in the field of water supply.
When the supply of water far outdistanced the demand, it made
little difference where or how a particular group of people acquired their water. When the quantity of demand begins to approach the availability of supply, however, the uncontrolled grabbing of available water resources by municipalities will preclude
equitable apportionment of the waters, interfere with the normal
development of the state, and create serious conflicts between municipalities competing for water. The water resource is intimately
connected with the expansion, development, and well-being of a
state. As the excess of water supply in a state dwindles, it is questionable whether the people as a whole will be benefited by allowing municipal authorities representing their own particular
interests to exercise great powers without state supervision in the
acquisition and control of the state's water resources.

